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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 February 1951

SUGGESTED REVISION OF MIE-29: YUGOSIAVIA

Since early in 1950 there have been indications of increas-21. ing military preparations in the satellite states. The strength of their armed forces has been substantially increased. Thereforces to a longe to lent have been re-squipped with Soviet material and have engaged in increasingly large-scale mansuvers, cupation forces in Hungary and Humania. They have substantial numbers of Soviet T-34 tanks, and recently JS heavy tanks and self-propelled guns have appeared in Hungary. Extensive gas and food rationing suggests stockpiling. Civilian defense measures have been undertaken. Increased registration for military service, including the medical profession, has been instituted, and security measures have been tightened. Satellite troops have been concentrated on the Yugoslav border and border incidents have increased. There have been rumors from Cominform circles of an impending attack on Yugoslavia in the the Cominform has renewed its propaganda alle

spring. The Common has renswed its propaganca welaway attack upon and albamia Athern repeating the

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pattern of last summer. For the first time Tito himself has begun to admit uneasiness. He has given serious consideration to seeking arms from the West and has attempted increasingly to tie Yugoslavia to the UN program of collective security. He has improved his relations with him Western Heller.

Austria, Italy, and Greece.

build-up and the intensity of Cominform propaganda indicate that the Kremlin urgently desires to develop Satellite capabilities for attacking Yugoslavia. There is however, no evidence as to develop a final decision setually to laured an attack has been reached. In the absence of such a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 must be considered a serious possibility.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 February 1951

SUGGESTED REVISION OF NIE-29, PAGES 12 and 13: YUGOSLAVIA

18. The industrial centers of Yugoslavia, on which the army currently depends for supplies, are located in the lowland border areas that would be overrun soon after hostilities had commenced. The better agricultural lands are in the same region and food would become a critical problem in the early stages of the campaign. Rail and motor routes from Trieste and Fiume would, in the event of an attack from Hungary, be cut off at an early stage.

In spite of these important losses, the large mountainous area which includes Bosnia, Hercegovina and Montenegro is suitable for the organization and maintenance of a strong defense, Food and munitions are now being stored in the mountainous regions, but these supplies would be exhausted rapidly in the event of hostilities. Defense of this area, therefore, would depend on Western aid which could be supplied through several moderately good Adriatic Sea ports along the Dalmatian coast. These ports and their transportation facilities are, however, highly vulnerable to air attack. Also, the road and rail routes from Salonika are vulnerable to ground attack from Bulgaria and Albania. The mountainous defensive area would be vulnerable to enemy penetrations from the directions of Zagreb and Fiume if such penetrations were undertaken before the organization of defensive positions. Several points along the Dalmatian coast might be vulnerable to amphibious DOCUMENT NO. attacks launched from Albanian bases.

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